Distractions

Easily distracted individual.

Stupidity and tediousness of the job is often a bit of a brain drain.

Anyhow, stalled a bit on reading Schelling. Not entirely out of my own choosing, however. Found some book deals for my Kindle and they suckered me in. Hook, line, and sinker. Like the naive consumer that I am. Instead, I am now reading and finishing up Cat's Cradle by Kurt Vonnegut. Have already read Slaughterhouse-Five by Vonnegut and loved the style of writing and storytelling, and thus far Cat's Cradle has been equally great. Then I went on a spree and got a bunch of freebies that they had available--mostly Vonnegut and Philip K. Dick, but with some assorted others. Believe I also got I am Legend by Richard Matheson. One of those books I've been meaning to get to ever since hearing about the movie years ago. Story is usually richer, and from what I've heard it should be a good one.

Trying to recall what was going on in Schelling now... Believe he was talking about commitments. True commitments are tough to keep and equally tough to leave behind. Furthermore, Schelling discussed a lot about communication. Communication is key in getting others to act or react in a certain manner (or to prevent particular actions). If a country cannot communicate a particular commitment strongly enough, then the alliance itself will seem like simple blowing smoke. Schelling's suggestion is that countries ought to put themselves in a position where the choice to honor or abandon a commitment is no longer in their hands, but rather in the hands of the targeted audience. This could be as simple as staging troops in allied areas. An attack would be seen as a direct assault on the country, rather than an attack on ally overseas. While the threat of war is credible in both situations (a promise to protect an ally abroad or the presence of troops in that country), the threat is more pressing in the latter case. If an attack were to target soldiers of the country, they would have no other choice than to react with equal vigor. This essentially puts in the hands of the opposition the ability to decide what is about to happen. They can either honor the commitment for what it is, or risk being instigators and aggressors of conflict.

Schelling suggests it is equally hard to escape commitments that are no longer beneficial or are of no strategic importance. If a country can simply walk out on their obligations to another country, what is there to prevent the impression that every commitment can be walked away from just as easily? This often results in honoring commitments regardless of whether a country would like to honor them or not. They simply cannot afford the loss in credibility. Perception defines the moment.

That's about all I can remember for now. Will have to hurry up with my more leisurely reading and catch up on Schelling. Not sure how that will go, but we'll see.