The Diplomacy of Violence

Quick update on Chapter One of Arms and Influence by Thomas C. Schelling:

Important points I'm getting from the first chapter on Schelling's work is that the ability to cause harm is often more powerful in a latent sense than in an actual sense. The threat of force is incredibly persuasive, the perceived ability to cause harm can change intentions, and the value of certain items, whether lives or territories, often change when juxtaposed with pure violence. This is culminated in the idea of the hostage situation: a hostage is of more use alive than dead, and certainly provides more bargaining power when alive. The ability to hold harm above their head only reinforces the necessity to make concessions. Diplomacy, therefore, is simple bargaining--often weighing opposing threats of violence (or in some cases one-sided threats).

When it comes to war, the threat of violence to a nation's people can come into play at different stages. Schelling touches on three primary eras of the citizen-war relationship:

1) The opposition of mercenary armies with limited warfare. Harming disputed people and territories only reduced the value of what the armies were fighting for, which defied the point of fighting. Furthermore, people in disputed territories were relatively unconcerned with whatever monarch might be in charge of them. They were more concerned with their immediate surroundings (e.g. their land and families) and the potential damage these armies might inflict upon it. This period, Schelling notes, was roughly from Westphalia to Napoleon.

2) The second stage involved the mass participation of people in wars. This is best viewed in the national effort brought forth by Napoleon. War became the interest of the people, war was fought by the people, war was fueled by the work of the people. The huge national effort made the outcome of war extremely personal, as one's fate was decided by success or failure.

3) Modern war sees competing military strengths with the looming threat of overwhelming civilian violence. Nuclear warheads can do in a short time what an army could take months or years to do. The ability to kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people has always been present (Schelling notes that the same amount of damage could be done with ice picks), but the ability to do so in such a quick fashion makes the threat of civilian violence immeasurably great. Perhaps more importantly, modern warfare is not limited to the classic bouts of competing armies. A nation does not need to defeat an opposing army in order to launch nuclear weapons. Rather, a bomb can be launched to take out civilian populations in order to avoid confrontation with armies. This has essentially reversed the typical military-civilian relationship in war. However, what we tend to see is a self-imposed limitation on the use of this force. The real power is held in the latent force of this potential to cause immense harm. Particularly, this grants the ability to influence and to bargain. The ramifications of an actual nuclear attack almost render it unusable, but the threat of its use grant untold influence. Nuclear devastation is difficult to forget.

Schelling summarizes poignantly: "Military strategy, whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence" (34).